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Caucasus Emirate 

The ongoing conflict in Russia's North Caucasus region continues to pose a threat to the stability of Russia, and to areas well beyond its borders. What began as an independence movement from the Russian Federation for one small ethnic group has evolved into a front in the global jihadist movement. As the movement for Chechen independence faltered, insurgents increasingly relied on Islamic ideologies to expand the conflict and attract support and funding from the greater Islamic community. The current insurgent leader declared the creation of the Caucasus Emirate (Imarat Kavkaz, IK) in 2007, which corresponds to Russia s North Caucasus region and purports to represent Russia's Muslim community. After nearly two decades of war, Russia has been unable to fully return stability to the area and the insurgents continue to attack Russian security forces in the region, as well as engage in horrific terror attacks in the heart of the Russian Federation.

 

The Caucasus Emirate was declared by its leader Doku Umarov (Abu Usman) in October 2007. The Caucasus Emirate seeks to establish a Taliban-style Sharia-based Islamist state on sovereign Russian Federation, Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani territory. The Caucasus Emirate has declared jihad against the Russian Federation, the United States, Great Britain, Israel, and any other state fighting international terrorists. The Caucasus Emirate and Al Qaeda and other international terrorist organizations cooperate with each other and often support each other with regard to personnel, training, financing, and propaganda.

 

Although the CE has stated that it has no conflict with the US, and will not harm any civilians, including Russians, this was not the case. Since its creation in 2007, the Caucasus Emirate has committed over 900 terrorist attacks on Russian territory, killing more than 900 and wounding more than 1,500 civilians, government officials, police, military, and security personnel. Such acts of violence against civilian targets are clearly intended to spread fear across all levels of society, injure, at least psychologically, a far greater number of people than those physically present at the scene of the attack, and thus constitute terrorism.

More Info:
 
  • Video: The Caucusus Emirate 
  • Video: Tribute to the Caucusus Emirate 
  • Podcast: Allegiance to ISIL splits Russian fighters

Annotated Biblography 

 

Campana, Aurélie, and Benjamin Ducol. "Voices of the 'Caucasus Emirate': Mapping and analyzing north Caucasus insurgency websites." Terrorism And Political Violence 27, no. 4 (August 2015): 679-700. PsycINFO, EBSCOhost (accessed April 12, 2016).

  • This article looks at “Internet use by insurgent groups in the North Caucasus in the context of a regional diffusion of violence.” The research combines hyperlink network analysis and micro-discourse analysis; it examines the online characteristics of the Caucasus Emirate and the main frames conveyed by the websites affiliated with the Emirate. It demonstrates the existence of a network of cross-referencing websites that, collectively, articulate the Emirate's political agenda online and allow for the dissemination of frames across the Web. It also shows that while jihadism provides a cultural resource that fosters a global sense of community, the jihadization of discourse does not eradicate local references as the local dynamics of the conflict have a strong impact on online communicative strategies. Finally, although based on a specific case study, this article “highlights the potential of a mixed methods research design as applied to an analysis of virtual insurgent networks” (Campana).

 

Knysh, Alexander. "Islam and Arabic as the Rhetoric of Insurgency: The Case of the Caucasus Emirate." Studies In Conflict & Terrorism 35, no. 4 (April 2012): 315-337. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed April 12, 2016).

  • This article addresses one concrete example of how some Muslim insurgents of the Northern Caucasus use Islam to unite the diverse and occasionally mutually hostile ethnic groups of the area in the face of Russian domination with the goal of establishing an independent Islamic state based on the Muslim Divine Law (Sharia). After providing a general overview of the history and ideology of this Islamic/Islamist movement, the article focuses on the ways in which its leadership uses the Internet to disseminate its understanding of Islam and to rally young Muslims round the idea of the trans-ethnic Sharia state that they promise to institute after defeating and expelling “the Russian occupiers” and their local backers. Special attention will be given to the role of Islamic concepts and taxonomies as well as the Arabic language in framing the political grammar of the insurgency movement known as “The Caucasus Emirate” (Knysh).

 

Knysh, Alexander. "Virtual Jihad in the Twenty-First Century: The Case of the Caucasus Emirate." Ab Imperio no. 1 (2010): 183. Project MUSE, EBSCOhost (accessed April 12, 2016).

  • “This article is devoted to the relatively recent (2007) Declaration on the establishment of Islamist armed groups (the Mujahideen) of the Caucasus Emirate.  The author analyzes the reasons of practical and ideological components that caused the creation of a new political organization. Caucasus Emirate exists as a virtual organization. Website kavkazcentre.com is the main body of the organization, as well as a tool for recruiting. Creation of the Mujahideen of the Emirate of the North Caucasus is an important milestone in the evolution of anti-Russian resistance in the region and marks the transition from disparate nationalist movements seeking political office, to transetnicheskomu Islamist movement, whose main goal is to establish a supranational Islamic state in the region. The article traces the conflict between the secular-oriented Chechen nationalists, the main task of which was to achieve independence from Russian by putting pressure on the Russian leadership by European and international organizations, and the Islamists, who see only the opportunity to make all of the North Caucasus from the power of 'infidels' in the anti-Russian jihad and Shariah approval. The author analyzes the practice of self-representation and advocacy strategy of the Mujahideen, in particular their aggressive use of the Internet for the approval of its presence in the virtual space. The presence of the Emirate in the virtual space to be correlated with poor physical presence in the region, where there is a predominance of military forces and material resources of the Russian Federation and loyal Kremlin local military units” (Knysh).

 

Shlapentokh, Dmitry. "The Rise of the Chechen Emirate?." Middle East Quarterly 15, no. 3 (Summer2008 2008): 49-56. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed April 12, 2016).

  • The author reports on the “tensions, which exist between the nationalists and jihadists in Chechnya.” Disagreements, which the two groups have regarding the alliances, which they should have with their religion and with Chechnya, are mentioned. The Chechen civil war which began in 1994 in which the relationships between nationalist resistance leaders and Islamist leaders worsened is discussed. The beliefs of “various Chechen leaders, including foreign minister Akhmed Khalidovich Zakaev, regarding the way in which the country should be governed are mentioned” (Shlapentokh).

 

"Special Series: Origin of the Caucasus Emirate." Stratfor Analysis (May 2011): 70. Business Source Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed April 12, 2016).

  • This article series explores the continued success of Russian operations against the so-called Caucasus Emirate (CE) “demonstrates that the Russians, for whom control of the Caucasus is a strategic imperative, have no intention of scaling back their counterinsurgency in an area that has long been a problem for the Kremlin.” Even after suffering sustained leadership losses, however, the CE still is able to recruit men and women to carry out terrorist operations inside and outside of the region. The CE was created and is led by Doku Umarov, a seasoned veteran of both the first and second Chechen wars in which he was in charge of his own battalion. In the years since, “Umarov has been declared dead numerous times yet he continues to appear in videos claiming attacks against Russian target”

 

"Special Series: Consolidation of the Caucasus Emirate." Stratfor Analysis (May 2011): 72. Business Source Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed April 12, 2016).

  • The Caucasus Emirate's goal is “to create an Islamic emirate in the North Caucasus region.” This emirate would be completely autonomous and independent of Russia and ruled by Shariah. Since the high-profile attack at Domodedovo airport in Moscow in January, pieces of the CE have continued their terror operations, including a symbolic attack in February at a ski resort on Mount Elbrus in Kabardino-Balkaria that killed three tourists. The CE was demonstrating that, despite its leadership losses and setbacks, some version of the group could still hit back. While exact numbers cannot be verified, the replenishment of the CE leadership and ranks shows that there are still those who are willing to die for the cause, despite the systematic killing of CE emirs. This means that “Russia's struggle to fully subdue and dominate the Caucasus is far from over.”

 

Vergani, Matteo, and Dennis Zuev. "Neojihadist Visual Politics: Comparing YouTube Videos of North Caucasus and Uyghur Militants." Asian Studies Review 39, no. 1 (March 2015): 1. Advanced Placement Source, EBSCOhost (accessed April 12, 2016).

  • YouTube videos offer a rare opportunity to gain an insight into the sequestered world of neo-jihadism. This study “examines and compares the lines of the visual narrative associated with two Asian insurgencies that help to form the global Islamic social movement: the insurgency in Chechnya and that in Xinjiang.” The purpose of the article is to describe the narratives used by the Islamic militants addressing the conflict and to identify similarities and differences in the use of visual rhetorical techniques by neojihadist groups to propagate their worldview. The study of the visual narratives promoted in the videos will help to provide a better understanding of the impact of the neojihadist narratives on the creation of collective identities. Our findings suggest that these narratives have similar features, which can be identified in a set of sub-narratives. Within the common pattern, however, “significant differences can be found, especially in the interpretation of the videos by the audiences” (Vergani).

 

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